Note -- this blog was updated on Feb 2, 2012 to highlight detection of the Symantec advisory SYM12-002 as well as new additional Nessus local checks to audit pcAnywhere installations.

With the recent news from Symantec that their source code theft has left pcAnywhere open to attack, it makes sense to audit your network for instances of this desktop sharing software. 

Nessus has many checks that identify the presence of pcAnywhere, the type of network access supported by it, and some vulnerabilties in the application. A current list is shown below for reference:

• 10006   Symantec pcAnywhere Status Service Detection (UDP)
• 10794   Symantec pcAnywhere Detection (TCP)               
• 10798   Symantec pcAnywhere Service Unrestricted Access       
• 20743   Symantec pcAnywhere Launch with Windows Caller Properties Local Privilege Escalation
• 32133   Symantec pcAnywhere Access Server Detection Service
• 35976   Symantec pcAnywhere CHF File Pathname Format String Denial of Service
• 57795   Symantec pcAnywhere Installed (local check)
• 57796   Symantec pcAnywhere Multiple Vulnerabilitities (SYM12-002)

In addition, running a credentialed scan with Nessus plugin 20811 provides the ability to detect installed software on Windows computers, which can be useful to find instances of pcAnywhere that may be installed, but not actively running. Note that strings and versions vary from release to release. An example string as reported by a recent Nessus scan is “Symantec pcAnywhere [version 11.5.0]”.

Network traffic can also be monitored with the Passive Vulnerability Scanner to identify instances of pcAnywhere on the network. A current list of passive plugins to detect pcAnywhere is shown below. 

• 03306 Symantec pcAnywhere Detection
• 06087 Symantec pcAnywhere Detected

Finally, Tenable’s Log Correlation Engine, will normalize logs from the PVS for observed pcAnywhere sessions in real-time with an event name of “PVS-PCAnywhere_Detected”. These sessions are automatically detected and analyzed for anomalies and connections from known botnets.

External Nessus scans can be performed to determine if your network has any Internet facing instances of pcAnywhere. The Nessus PerimeterService is ideal for this type of scanning as it can scan an unlimited number of Internet-facing IP addresses very rapidly. Users of the Passive Vulnerability Scanner have automatic detection of any Internet-facing service, including pcAnywhere.

An in-depth Nessus Discussions Forum post details how SecurityCenter, Passive Vulnerabiltiy Scanner and Log Correlation Engine users can track pcAnywhere vulnerabilities and usage in realtime.  

I attended the Black Hat Briefings this year after teaching the "Advanced Vulnerability Scanning Using Nessus" course. There were several really great presentations covering a wide range of topics. My only wish is that I could have cloned myself and attended more of the talks! Following is a recap of the presentations I attended:

Don Bailey - War Texting Weaponizing Machine 2 Machine

Several of the presentations this year centered on the topic of embedded systems. This is right up my alley, as I've always had a fascination with embedded computing. Don gave some great examples of embedded systems, including:

The Now "Infamous" Sony Hack

It was reported late last month that attackers had penetrated Sony's PSN (PlayStation Network) platform. It has been rumored that reverse engineering the PlayStation firmware, coupled with vulnerabilities in Linux servers and unencrypted data traversing the network, led to the exposure of over 77 million users’ information being leaked, possibly including 2.2 million credit card numbers.

Nessus plugin 29871 has been updated to look for the presence of malicious JavaScript on a remote web site.

(See Attack on ASP site that uses a SQL server database)

Below is an example of the plugin report:

Click for larger image

Successful Attacks from Automated Malware

Recently, malware dubbed "LizaMoon" (named after the first web site found distributing it) has been popping up in the news:

Dubbed LizaMoon, unidentified perpetrators of the scareware campaign inject script into legitimate URLs, so when people try to access the website, they get redirected to a page warning them that their PCs are infected with malware that can be removed by downloading a free AV application called Windows Stability Center.

From LizaMoon SQL Injection Attack Hits Websites

LizaMoon scans web sites for easily exploitable SQL injection vulnerabilities, then uses that to put redirects on the web site that take users to a site which installs malware. This is not a new form of attack, however the "Lizamoon" malware has been surprisingly successful. Google searches for infected sites report that over 1.5 million pages have been infected. The important thing to not about the numbers of infection is "pages" does not refer to sites, as a site can have multiple infected pages. This type of attack typically works as follows:

Recently I attended the Secure World Boston conference to sit in on a panel with industry experts about APT (Advanced Persistent Threat, for a great write-up on the definition see Richard Bejtlich's article titled, "What Is APT and What Does It Want?"). Following are some of my thoughts on the topic:

• Is APT something that everyone should be worrying about and planning for (is APT pervasive or just hype)? – APT is a new buzzword, but of course such threats have been around as long as there have been computer networks. It makes me think back Clifford Stoll’s book titled “The Cuckoos Egg”. I love Cliff’s analogy of “jiggling” the keys over the communications lines to disrupt the attackers just enough, but still give them enough access to keep an eye on them.

• Explain how APT works (reconnaissance, phishing, infection, exfiltration)? – The recon phase is the toughest to defend against and the most important phase to an attacker. Pre-texting is so important, yet much of the information has to be public and it’s tough to detect when someone is doing recon. This may turn into targeted phishing attacks, which are increasingly more successful. No matter how hard we try, we can’t educate all our users and expect them to catch 100% of the attacks - we have to rely on technology and training to ward off these attacks. Inevitably, people get into our systems and we need to have measures to detect unauthorized access to our systems. It’s presumptuous to think that your organization will never have a breach.

The CCDC 2011

The Collegiate Cyber Defense Competition (CCDC) is always a fantastic and educational event, and this year was no exception. Hundreds of people converged to share ideas, learn how to hack, learn how to defend and talk about security. Below is a brief summary of the happenings at the event:

• The Attackers - Many of the same people as previous years filled the role of the "hackers". They did a great job this year and showed how much they've learned over the years. The big takeaway from the Red Team is sharing. Using a new tool called "Armitage", they were able to share shell access to the Blue Team hosts, proving that sharing truly is caring.
• The Defenders - By design, the Blue teams are put at a disadvantage. This is meant to emulate the real world, where attackers have vast resources and often stay a step ahead. However, the Blue teams were very creative, employing reverse sabotage by leaving pieces of paper around the event with usernames and passwords written on them, which were completely fake.





The Red Team was able to re-configure the Blue Team's phones and leave them messages on the display, a digital "love note" if you will. Phones for the Blue Team were ringing throughout the event, playing random WAV files from a server as well.

Getting to ShmooCon each year is always challenging (as is trying to get home). Mother Nature seems to enjoy disrupting the travel to and from the conference, which is held in Washington, D.C in January or February of each year. Despite the weather issues, I've always found it to be a conference worth attending. It features quality talks, leading security researchers sharing thoughts and ideas and several extra events such as "Firetalks" and "Hacker Karaoke".

From Printer to Domain Admin

I've always been fascinated with the concept of attacking printers. The common misconception of "oh, it’s only a printer" makes them a prime target for attackers because people believe that printers pose little to no security risk. This mindset typically translates to the following conditions, which help to fuel my fascination:

Balancing Risk

Security continues to be a balance between providing users with features and mitigating risk. . Client-side vulnerabilities seem to be the hole that many of us are stuck spinning our wheels in.

"Silent" Worms: Stuxnet

The vulnerability patched with MS10-061 is perhaps one of the most interesting we've covered in a "Patch Tuesday" post this year. The vulnerability was discovered when antivirus researchers at Kaspersky Lab analyzed malware called "Stuxnet". The malware was one of the first worms to use the LNK vulnerability, and contained code to exploit three other vulnerabilities, the print spooler vulnerability patched by MS10-061 and two other unnamed privilege escalation vulnerabilities that have yet to be patched. Its not everyday that we hear of malware in the wild exploiting 4 0-day vulnerabilities.

I am not easily impressed (in fact, I am even less than impressed) with the capabilities of most malware in the wild. However, there are some facts about the "Stuxnet" malware that do impress me:

• Stuxnet also contains an exploit for a vulnerability from 2008. It will only execute this exploit if it determines it is inside an organization using SCADA systems and not a typical corporation.
• Stuxnet was written specifically to attack control systems, and is the first publicly known malware to contain a rootkit for PLCs, devices that control SCADA systems. The rootkit silently waits for commands.
• Stuxnet gains access to control systems using default passwords and is rumored to have compromised 14 different control systems-based organizations.
• Stuxnet was first thought to primarily use USB devices to propagate (likely to get around "air gapped" security measures)

There was an interesting quote from Symantec that stated, "Symantec gained control of the domain used to send commands to infected machines shortly after Stuxnet was discovered". Apparently, this turned over control of Stuxnet-infected systems to Symantec. I just don't understand the logic behind the malware authors; if they had used fast flux, they may still have control over the botnet they seemed to have worked so hard to implement.

Recent investigations into the Google "Aurora" incident uncovered evidence that Chinese attackers used a 0-day exploit for Internet Explorer to gain access to Google employees’ computer systems. This event has sparked the release of Microsoft Security Bulletin MS10-002 - Critical , and a public exploit for the vulnerability. To mitigate this vulnerability, Microsoft originally recommended that customers upgrade to Internet Explorer 8, and enable DEP (Data Execution Prevention). On January 21, 2010 Microsoft released an "out-of-band" patch for the vulnerability, which fixes the problem on Internet Explorer version 6, 7 and 8. Methods exist to reliably exploit Internet Explorer versions 6 & 7, and there are several people who have working exploits for IE version 8, including Dino Dai Zovi, a well-respected vulnerability researcher. (A concise list of the details surrounding this issue can be found in this article).

Being Proactive

Many organizations are likely to implement the patch released by Microsoft since the issue has been receiving a lot of media attention. Patching because of a media event is an all-too-common mistake made by many organizations that cannot be convinced to implement new security measures until exploits make the news. Patching systems needs to be part of an organization’s overall strategy – not just a reaction to a media event. When new technologies become available as upgrades to your existing systems, put a plan in place to test and migrate to them, especially if they offer increased security. The organizations doing this today are looking at the latest exploit and implementing their patch strategy as part of the standard operating procedure.

Airport "Security"

Those of us who travel through any U.S. airport are used to the inconvenience of airport security - the long lines, metal detectors, having to take off your shoes, belts, earrings, and of course the ominous "liquids and gels" inspection. While most people accept these inconveniences as an unfortunate necessity, much of what has been implemented shares some of the common pitfalls found in many computer and network security programs. Using the U.S. airport security model as an example, let’s take a look at some of the security being implemented and relate it to security gone wrong in the enterprise:

The dreaded long lines at airport security are a by-product of the current security model at U.S. airports.

Wired magazine recently ran an excellent story detailing how Walmart suffered a deep intrusion. The story provides many examples of cliché security lapses such as not disabling a remote VPN account for a former Walmart worker. This blog entry describes how customers using Tenable Unified Security Monitoring solutions can learn from these mistakes and get more value out of their investment with Tenable.